Akrasia is the phenomenon of acting against one’s better judgment, or failing to do what one believes one ought to do. It is a topic that has been discussed by many philosophers, both ancient and modern, and has implications for ethics, psychology, and free will.
Some of the most important analytic papers on akrasia are:
- Rational Akrasia by John Brunero1. Brunero argues that akrasia is not necessarily irrational, and that there are cases where one can rationally intend to do something that one believes one ought not to do.
- Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism by James Fritz2. Fritz defends impurism, the view that certain non-truth-relevant factors can affect the epistemic status of a belief, and shows how it can explain cases of epistemic akrasia, where one believes something that one thinks one should not believe.
- Akrasia and Uncertainty by Ralph Wedgwood3. Wedgwood contends that akrasia is only irrational if one is certain about what one ought to do, and that uncertainty can make akrasia rational or at least excusable.
- Complex Akrasia and Blameworthiness by Anna Hartford4. Hartford examines the conditions under which akratic agents are morally blameworthy, and argues that akrasia is not a sufficient condition for blameworthiness, but rather depends on the agent’s reasons and motives.
These are some of the papers that I think are worth reading if you are interested in the problem of akrasia. I hope you find them helpful and informative. 😊
1: Rational Akrasia 2: Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism 3: Akrasia and Uncertainty 4: Complex Akrasia and Blameworthiness
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